DISENTANGLING TEXTUALISM AND ORIGINALISM
Katie Eyer *
Textualism and originalism are not the same interpretive theory. 1
Textualism commands adherence to the text. 2 Originalism, in contrast,
commands adherence to history. 3 It should be self-evident that these are
not—put simply—the same thing. While textualism and originalism may
in some circumstances be harnessed to work in tandem—or may in some
circumstances lead to the same result—they are different inquiries, and
command fidelity to different ultimate guiding principles. In situations of
conflict, a textualist is ultimately faithful to the text—while an originalist
is ultimately faithful to history. 4

*
Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School. This Essay focuses on one aspect of a larger work-inprogress which calls for renewed theorizing to revitalize textualism, Textualism Revisited. See Katie
Eyer, Textualism Revisited (work in progress). Note that as a part of that broader project, I also take
up the question of whether it is appropriate to treat constitutional and statutory interpretive
methodologies as interchangeable, something that, for the purpose of simplicity, I assume here. A
video of the Constitution Day lecture that was given sketching the contours of the wider project is
available here at The Center for Constitutional Law at Akron. Many thanks to Jessica Clarke, Earl
Maltz, Stephen Sachs, Sandra Sperino, and Deborah Widiss for helpful feedback on this project. I am
particularly grateful to Larry Solum for his generous feedback and suggestions.
1. It is of course possible to find many works that suggest to the contrary—that suggest that
originalism, textualism or both, are necessarily tethered to the “original public meaning of text.” My
point here is that this represents sloppy and potentially dangerous conceptual reasoning—even if one
thinks the best version of textualism is one linked to original meaning, or that the best version of
originalism is one linked to text, each methodology begins with a distinctive guiding star (text for
textualism and history for originalism), and conceptual precision is needed to ensure that we honor
either of those commitments. Cf. Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism Without Text, 127 YALE L.J. 156,
157-62 (2017) (making a similar point from the perspective of originalism’s primary commitments).
2. See, e.g., ANTONIN S CALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23 (1997).
3. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Time, Institutions, and Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV.
1745, 1756 (2015).
4. As set out in Part I, infra, I do think it is possible for an individual to be both a faithful
textualist and a faithful originalist, as many scholars and judges identify themselves. However, as set
out in this Essay, I think that for these individuals it is especially critical to be aware that textualism
and originalism are not the same interpretive theory and that even originalist theories that are
commonly thought of as being textualist in nature—such as original public meaning—can easily slide
into contra-textualist analysis, if an adjudicator is not careful to prioritize their textualist interpretiv e
commitments.
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Why should this common-sense observation warrant academic
commentary? Because both textualists and originalists—and even those
who eschew such methodologies—are surprisingly inclined to conflate
the two. 5 This tendency toward conflation has existed since the early days
of modern textualism and originalism. But with the rise of the “original
public meaning” paradigm, it has become even more common for
textualists/originalists 6 to conflate the two. 7 Indeed, it is common (though
not universal) today for textualists/originalists to treat textualism and
originalism as a single inseparable package (adjudicated under the
moniker of “original public meaning”), and to decline to rigorously
delineate them in both theorizing and analysis. 8
5. This is true in both the statutory interpretation and the constitutional law literature, though
it is more common to hear people describe the conflated theory as “textualism” in the statutory
interpretation context (while assuming that textualism also entails fidelity to originalist principles),
and “originalism” in the constitutional law context (while assuming that originalism also entails
fidelity to textualist principles). See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Disaggregating Chevron, 82 OHIO ST.
L. J. 249, 265 (2021) (describing statutory textualism as definitionally including resort to “the content
conveyed by the text to the intended readers . . . at the time the statute was enacted”); Lawrence B.
Solum, Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate,
113 NORTHWESTERN L. R EV. 1243, 1245 (2019) (tying originalism in the constitutional law context
to “the family of constitutional theories that affirm . . . the meaning of the constitutional text is fixed
at the time each provision is drafted.”) Note that for the purposes of this short Essay, I do not take up
the issue of whether it is appropriate to adopt differing interpretive methodologies for different types
of legal texts (constitutional law, statutory law, regulatory law).
6. As described herein, I do not think it is appropriate to conflate textualism and originalism,
since they are different—and not always consistent—legal interpretive approaches. Nevertheless ,
since others do, I think it is useful to have a term to describe the common phenomenon of conflation
of the two. Thus, when I use the term “textualism/originalism” or “textualist/originalist,” I mean to
signify someone who at least some of the time conflates these two interpretive approaches. In
contrast, when I use the term “textualism” or “textualist,” I mean to describe the interpretive theory
in which an adjudicator’s ultimate fidelity is to text. And when I use the term “originalism” or
“originalist,” I mean to describe the interpretive theory in which an adjudicator’s ultimate fidelity is
to history.
7. See sources cited infra note 8.
8. See, e.g., NEIL GORSUCH, A R EPUBLIC, IF YOU C AN KEEP IT 106 (2019) (stating that
textualism and originalism may be “little more than different ways to say the same thing”); see also,
e.g., ANTONIN S CALIA & B RYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW : THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS
xxvii (2012) (characterizing textualists as those who “look for meaning in the governing text [and]
ascribe to that text the meaning that it has borne from its inception.”); James A. Macleod, Finding
Original Public Meaning, 56 GEORGIA L. R EV. 1, 1 (2021) (stating as an obvious and uncontested
proposition that “[t]extualists seek to interpret statutes consistent with their ‘original public
meaning’”); Ilan Wurman, What is Originalism? Debunking the Myths, The Conversation,
https://theconversation.com/what-is-originalism-debunking-the-myths-148488 (posing the question
“[w]hat’s the difference between originalism and textualism?” and answering “[d]espite popular
belief, there is no difference between the two”); Brett Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearings, Day 2, Part
2, 1:56, CSPAN, https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4747420/user-clip-kavanaugh-originalism
(“Originalism, as I see it, means, in essence constitutional textualism, meaning the original public
meaning of the constitutional text.”).
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Surprisingly, this tendency towards the conflation of textualism and
originalism is also common even among those who might seem most
inclined to point out this logical fallacy—textualism/originalism’s
critics. 9 Nor is the conflation of textualism and originalism specific to
conservative adherents of textualism/originalism, but rather has seeped
into even progressive commentators’ understanding of the
textualist/originalist project. 10 Thus today, it is rare to see judges or
commentators—on either the right or left, inside or outside of the
community of committed textualists/originalists—insist on the
importance of disaggregating textualism and originalism as interpretive
methods.
In this Essay—a part of a longer project on the need for independent
theorizing on textualism’s future—I argue that disentangling textualism
and originalism is critical to both the future vibrancy and the legitimacy
of textualism as an interpretive methodology. When conflated with
originalism, textualism holds almost endless opportunities for partisan
manipulation of precisely the kind that textualism’s critics have decried.
Moreover, and most troublingly, many types of originalist inquiry can
lead judges to results inconsistent with text—and thus textualism. In short,
in order for an adjudicator to have genuine fidelity to any interpretive
theory, it is critical for the adjudicator to know to which theory, in cases
of conflict, the adjudicator ultimately subscribes.
The remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows. Part I describes the
ways that textualism and originalism can functionally interact: as almost
entirely distinctive theories (“acquaintances”), working in tandem
(“allies”), or as conflicting methodological approaches (“antagonists”).
Part II provides a brief history of the evolution of mainstream originalism
from an approach (“original intent”) that clearly conflicted with
textualism in many instances, to one that on its face need not (“original
public meaning”), but that in practice has often been applied in conflict
with textualist principles. Part III concludes with a call for those who
identify themselves as textualist/originalists to clarify their principle
methodological commitments—and for those who have eschewed both to
reconsider the potential of a disaggregated textualism.
9. See, e.g., Cary Franklin, Living Textualism, 2020 S UP. C T. R EV. 119, 120-21 (2021).
10. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism,
97 VA. L. R EV. 1523, 1526-27 (2011). Jack Balkin’s work generally does a good job of disentangling
the textualist and originalist aspects of his interpretive methodology, but perhaps because it has been
framed as an “originalist” project first, has not necessarily spurred the type of careful disaggregation
of textualism and originalism that I argue here is required for true fidelity to text. See, e.g., JACK
B ALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 39-45 (2011).
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I. TEXTUALISM AND ORIGINALISM AS ACQUAINTANCES,
ANTAGONISTS, OR ALLIES
As described above, textualism and originalism are not the same
interpretive theory. Textualism holds as its central commitment fidelity to
legal text. 11 In contrast, originalism holds as its foundational commitment
fidelity to history. 12 This Part takes up the question of how these two
distinctive interpretive theories can functionally interact: as almost
entirely distinctive methodological approaches (“acquaintances”), as
conflicting methodological approaches (“antagonists”), or as
complementary approaches to interpretation (“allies”). It suggests that in
order for an adjudicator to adhere to any of these perspectives on the
proper relationship of textualism to originalism faithfully, it will be
important for that adjudicator to identify their ultimate interpretive
commitment, so that they will be able to identify and appropriately
address how to proceed in situations of apparent conflict.
It is useful to begin by exploring what textualism would look like
entirely decoupled from originalism (the “acquaintances” approach).
Although textualism and originalism are commonly conflated, it is of
course possible to have a textualist methodology that is entirely decoupled
from originalist commitments. Thus, an interpreter could hold the view
that it is important to adhere to textual meaning—whether of a statute, the
constitution, or a regulation—but not that it is important to look to history
or historical context in so doing. Such an interpretive approach might be
deemed a “living” or “dynamic” textualism, i.e., the idea that the content
or meaning of the words of a legal text can evolve over time. 13
Few scholars or adjudicators ascribe to the most radical version of
this theory, for good reason. Where the meaning of a law’s word or phrase
has dramatically changed over time to an entirely new meaning, few
would contend that the modern meaning should control. Thus, for
example, it would seem absurd to most people to argue that the
Constitution’s guaranty of protection to the states against “domestic
violence” (intended to protect against home-grown uprisings) should be
taken today to refer to intimate partner violence, even though “domestic

11. See supra note 2.
12. See supra note 3.
13. Note that although I borrow his reference to “dynamic” statutory interpretation here, Bill
Eskridge’s theory of dynamic statutory interpretation is not centered on this type of “dynamic
textualism.” See generally WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC S TATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994)
(developing a broader and distinctive theory of dynamic statutory interpretation).
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violence” is today overwhelmingly used in this way. 14 When semantic
drift has led to radically different modern meanings of a term used in a
legal text, most adjudicators and theorists of all kinds would agree that the
historical, not the modern, understanding should be used.
Far more likely to be debated is the question of whether a term which
has not radically changed its meaning—but may have changed in some of
its more nuanced connotations—ought to be viewed in terms of history,
or in terms of what we know now. The word “sex” in anti-discrimination
law is an often-debated example of this. Do we care in construing the word
“sex” about modern understandings of the term, or how it may have
evolved since the time of enactment? 15 Or do we try to restrict ourselves
only to those understandings of sex that were extant at the time? 16 While
as the Bostock v. Clayton County opinion illustrated, the outcome of this
debate may not matter for some applications of anti-discrimination law,
in other contexts we must ask ourselves whether a “dynamic” or an
“original” understanding of the words of a law should be applied. 17
Either of these alternatives—a “dynamic” or an “original”
understanding of sex—are consistent with textualism, though only the
latter is consistent with originalism. Thus, it is entirely possible for an
adjudicator to have a fidelity to text, but not to any strong version of
history or original meaning. Such an adjudicator might believe it is
appropriate for the content of complicated words to evolve over time as
our understanding does—even if a radically different meaning from a new
context (i.e., the “domestic violence” problem) should be rejected. This
might be termed the “acquaintances” view of how textualism and
originalism ought to interact—as generally distinctive theories and
methodological commitments, which need not necessarily run together.

14. U.S. C ONST. art. IV, § 4; see also B ALKIN, supra note 10, at 37 (providing this as an example
of why it is important to follow original semantic meaning).
15. See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 577 F.Supp.2d 293, 306 (D.D.C. 2008) (describing
argument of the plaintiff relying on modern medical understandings of the term “sex” to argue for
protection of transgender worker under Title VII, but ultimately ruling for the plaintiff on other
grounds).
16. Note that there are, of course, dramatically competing accounts of what “sex” meant, even
in 1964—as well as what it means today, and that more may turn on the outcome of those debates
than on the historical evolution aspect of this question. Compare, e.g., William Eskridge, Jr., Brian
G. Slocum & Stefan Th. Greis, The Meaning of Sex: Dynamic Words, Novel Applications, and
Original Public Meaning, 119 MICH. L. R EV. 1503, 1554-58 (2021); with Brief for Petitioners
Altitude Express & Ray Maynard at 13, Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S.Ct. 1731 (2020).
17. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. ___, 140 S.Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020) (accepting for
the sake of argument the assumption that sex in Title VII should be given its narrowest historical
understanding, but concluding that anti-LGBT discrimination was nevertheless “because of . . . sex”).
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At the other end of the spectrum are those who argue that textualism
and originalism should, or necessarily do, work together. This is the
dominant view of most textualist/originalists, and likely the reason why it
is so common for theorists to decline to disaggregate the two. 18 But this
Part will suggest that there are in practice two diametrically different ways
that textualism and originalism can functionally interact where they are
purported to be working together. 19 First, originalism and textualism can
work together as “allies”—used to understand the meaning of a legal text
in light of the meaning of the words at the time of enactment. But they can
also function as “antagonists,” in which “original meaning”
methodologies are used to supersede text. Importantly, only the former is
consistent with fidelity to text and to textualism.
A few examples may help to illustrate the distinction. One of the
most non-controversial examples of textualism and originalism working
as “allies”—in tandem not in conflict—is the above example of the
Constitution’s reference to “domestic violence.” 20 Historical context and
meaning easily tell us that the when the Founders used this term, they
were not referring to intimate partner violence, but instead home-grown
American violence. 21 Armed with this historical knowledge, it is then
possible to construct a straightforward textual understanding of Article
IV, Section 4 as a guaranty by the federal government to come to the aid
of the states in case of home-grown violence or insurrection. In this
context, history works in tandem with text (as “allies”), rather than
conflicting with it.
Another, more nuanced example of textualism and originalism acting
as “allies” can be seen in the context of New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira. 22 In
that case, the question was whether an exemption from the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) for “contracts of employment” of certain
transportation workers should be understood to be limited to contracts
between employers and employees—or should also be understood to
extend to contracts of independent contractors. 23 While the Court
18. See sources cited supra note 8.
19. It is important to note that this is not a new observation. Indeed, Ronald Dworkin made a
very similar observation in his famous dialogue with Justice Scalia when he observed that Justice
Scalia was an inconsistent textualist insofar as he often in practice embraced “expectationoriginalism” instead of “semantic-originalism”—and that only the latter was consistent with
textualism. See Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in ANTONIN S CALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
119-21 (1997).
20. See sources cited supra note 14.
21. Id.
22. 139 S.Ct. 532 (2019).
23. Id. at 536.
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observed that “[t]o many lawyerly ears today, the term ‘contracts of
employment’ might call to mind only agreements between employers and
employees,” it found that at the time of the FAA’s enactment, “contracts
of employment” was understood differently. Rather, “employment” was
generally used as a synonym for “work” and “contracts of employment”
was often used to extend to independent contractors. 24 Thus, originalism
in New Prime suggested a different understanding of the meaning of the
term “contracts of employment” than an avowedly non-originalist
methodological approach might—but via an approach in which
originalism helped to understand text, rather than to undermine it.
In contrast, textualism and originalism can, just as often, act as
“antagonists.” In such contexts following originalism—or at least certain
versions of it—will necessarily entail departures from adherence to text.
For example, no one contends that the Eleventh Amendment’s text alone
can be understood to compel the very broad principles of state sovereign
immunity that the modern Supreme Court has adopted. 25 And yet many
textualist/originalist judges have nevertheless defended those principles,
based on an historical understanding of state sovereign immunity at the
time of the founding and the Eleventh Amendment’s ratification. 26 While
this may be consistent with originalism (although this history too has been
extensively debated), it is not consistent with a textualist reading of the
Eleventh Amendment. 27 In contexts such as these (where text and history

24. Id. at 539-40.
25. Indeed, such an assertion would be laughable, given that the Supreme Court has applied the
Eleventh Amendment to many contexts to which it clearly does not apply. See, e.g., sources cited
infra note 26.
26. Cf. U.S. C ONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”); with Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that states were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment where
such suits were brought by citizens of their own states, in state court); Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred suits against a state by citizens of
its own state); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (same).
27. Prominent originalists Will Baude and Stephen Sachs have articulated the view that we
ought to disaggregate the textualist components of the Eleventh Amendment and the separat e
common-law immunity which states possessed at the time of the founding, and argue that in so doing,
much (but not all) of modern sovereign immunity can be justified on one or the other grounds, at least
when coupled with a narrow reading of Congress’s authority to abrogate common-law immunity. See
William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Misunderstood Eleventh Amendment, 169 U. P A. L. R EV.
609, 613 (2021). Importantly, however, even Baude and Sachs do not contend that the Supreme
Court’s interpretive approach is consistent with textualism. See, e.g., id. at 611 (noting that the
Eleventh Amendment’s supporters, including those on the Court have “[read] the Amendment for
more than it’s worth.”) Without offering a view here on the Baude/Sachs theory, I will simply note
that it is not the theory on which the Supreme Court itself has justified its modern sovereign immunity
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are simply inconsistent), originalism and textualism act as “antagonists”
in the sense that one cannot comply with both.
A more subtle, but even more common example of this type of
“antagonistic” relationship between textualism and originalism comes
from the long tail of “original expected applications” methodologies, even
at a time when such methodologies have nominally been mostly
discredited. In the following Part, I take up defending the claim that many
modern originalist arguments continue to devolve into “original expected
applications” approaches, even where framed within the new originalist
construct of “original public meaning.” 28 In this Part, I will simply
observe that such “original expected applications” methodologies—
whether framed as “original intent,” or as they more commonly are today
as “original public meaning”—are almost always inconsistent with a
textualist approach.
Why is this? Many of our statutory and constitutional provisions—
including many of our most important guarantees of rights—are framed
in textually broad terms, at the level of principles 29 not application. 30 A
textualist approach to such a provision will ask what the words mean at
the level at which they are pitched—that is, as a principle, not an asapplied prescription. 31 Armed with an understanding of this broad-brush
cases, and that the Court’s own reasoning purports to be grounded on history, while clearly being
plainly contra-textual.
28. See infra Part II.
29. Here, and throughout, I use “principles” in the colloquial sense, and not as a term of art (i.e.,
not as it is used in the rules/standards/principles literature). Thus, my use of “principles” is intended
to connote the legal constraints that text provides, regardless of whether those constraints would be
characterized as a principle, rule, or standard in the principles/rules/standard literature. Cf. Lawrence
B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Rules, Standards, and Principles, LEGAL THEORY B LOG, (Sept. 6,
2009),
https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2009/09/legal-theory-lexicon-rules-standards-and principles.html#:~:text=Principles%20provide%20mandatory%20considerations%20for,be%20rele
vant%20to%20the%20decision (describing the rules/standards/principles literature, and the way in
which rules, standards, and principles are used in that literature as terms of art to connote differing
levels of precision in the law).
30. See, e.g., U.S. C ONST., amend. 14, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.”)
31. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 19, at 119 (making this observation); B ALKIN, supra note
10, at 45-46 (same).
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principle, an interpreter following a textualist approach would then be
compelled to apply this principle—derived from the text—to consider if
it included the application at hand. 32 The more broadly worded the
provision is, the broader the textual principle that it likely creates, and the
more likely it is that it will afford rights to a variety of groups, in a variety
of contexts—or in the case of criminal or regulatory law, that it will
constrain across a variety of groups or contexts.
But an “original expected applications” approach instead invites us
to gerrymander broad text to only extend to those contexts where the
adjudicator believes the enactor, or the public, would have expected or
intended them. 33 Thus, instead of asking for example what it means at a
level of principle to “deny . . . equal protection of the laws” 34 or to take
an adverse employment action “because of . . . sex,” 35 an original
expected applications approach asks whether a particular application of a
rights principle (often one that is maligned or politically unpopular) would
have been “expected” at the time. 36
Similarly, an original expected applications approach can exempt
groups and applications from the operation of criminal or regulatory law
that are unexpected because they are comparatively favored. Consider, for
example, the holding of the Supreme Court in Church of the Holy Trinity
v. United States that a white rector and pastor from England should be
excluded from a criminal law proscription on the importation of aliens
because the law was, despite its broad text, intended only to apply to the
work of the “manual laborer, as distinguished from that of the professional
man.” 37 In these contexts, history is not used in service of understanding
the meaning of broad textual mandates, but instead as a way of confining
them to only preferred applications. 38
There thus are two very different ways in which textualism and
originalism can work together—as “allies,” in service of a historicallyinformed understanding of a statute or constitutional provision’s words
and terms of art—or as “antagonists” wherein originalism is taken as a
32. See sources cited supra note 31.
33. As set out in the following Part II, although the preferred originalist terminology has
evolved here (from “original intent” to “original public meaning”) the threat of deviations from text
remains the same.
34. U.S. C ONST. amend. 14, § 1.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
36. For an example, see the “original expected applications” arguments made in response to
attempts to apply Title VII at the level of textualist principle to the context of anti-LGBT
discrimination. See infra Part II.
37. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 463 (1892).
38. Id.
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justification for overriding text or limiting broad textual principles. Most
modern textualist/originalists would likely claim that they follow the
former “allied” approach. So why does it remain important to disentangle
textualism from originalism?
As set out in Part II, despite protestations to the contrary, examples
of the “antagonistic” application of textualism and originalism by
textualist/originalists remain common, especially in the real world of
originalism in the courts. In particular, it is common for “original public
meaning”—which was supposed to supplant discredited “original intent”
or “original expected application” approaches—to slide in practice back
into functionally indistinguishable approaches (approaches which are, as
set out above, methodologically inconsistent with textualism). Crediting
the good faith of textualists/originalists (as I largely do), this problem
seems to derive precisely from the fuzziness generated by the
longstanding conflation of textualism and originalism. It is only with
clarity of interpretive commitments—to text above history when they
conflict—that it becomes comparatively easier to identify where the line
lies between useful historical context and prohibited historical
gerrymandering.
The following Part takes up the arc of originalist theorizing with
respect to “original expected applications,” and argues that although such
arguments have lost credence among many mainstream originalist
theorists, it is common for originalist analysis to in practice devolve into
such approaches, especially where there is an outcome that is surprising
or ideologically divergent from the judge’s or theorist’s own views at
stake. Relying on the example of Bostock v. Clayton County, it takes up
the issue of how “original expected applications” or even “original intent”
can be framed as “original public meaning” arguments that are virtually
indistinguishable from their discredited predecessors.
II. THE PERSISTENCE OF “ORIGINAL E XPECTED APPLICATIONS”
APPROACHES TO ORIGINALISM
The story of the evolution of originalism as an interpretive theory is
a complex one, but for the purposes of this Essay can be told briefly. The
earliest versions of modern originalism, articulated by Judge Bork, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Edwin Meese, and others in the 1970s and 1980s,
explicitly hewed to an “original intent” approach. 39 Focused on the

39. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, What is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary
Originalist Theory, in THE C HALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF C ONSTITUTIONAL
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“original intent” of the framers, this initial version of originalism was
predictably “antagonistic” to textualism in many instances, since it called
for the primacy of historically-derived intent or expectations about the
application of the law, not the meaning of broad textual principles. 40
But faced with a variety of trenchant critiques, this initial version of
originalism as an interpretive methodology evolved. 41 Today, although
there remain a diversity of strands of originalist theory, the dominant
strain endorses a search for “original public meaning” as the metric of
originalism. 42 Moreover, most mainstream versions of “original public
meaning” in legal academia explicitly eschew “original expected
applications” approaches. 43 Indeed, many academic scholars of original
public meaning explicitly stress the importance of text as critical, indeed,
central to the originalist enterprise. 44
Ironically, it may be precisely this academic turn to text in the context
of “original public meaning”—and the related repudiation of expected
applications—that has solidified the perception that textualism and
originalism are interchangeable theories—and thus enhanced the
likelihood of uncritical slide in practice from one to the other. Scholars of
original public meaning generally conceptualize “original public
meaning” as being inherently a textualist theory of interpretation. 45 This
has led to the wide perception that “original public meaning” is inherently
INTERPRETATION 6-10 (2011); Keith Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM
L. R EV. 375, 379-86 (2013).
40. See sources cited supra note 39.
41. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 39, at 6-15 (offering an account of the critiques that spurred an
evolution in originalist theorizing, and how such theorizing evolved).
42. Id. at 15-16; Whittington, supra note 39, at 380.
43. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 252–
54, 254 n.64, 295–97 (2009); Richard H. Fallon, The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its
Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. C HI . L. R EV. 1235, 1291 (2015); Stephen G.
Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 103 NORTHWESTERN U. L.
R EV. 663, 668-671 (2009); Solum, supra note 39, at 18–19; Whittington, supra note 39, at 382–86.
But see Jamal Greene, The Age of Scalia, 130 HARV. L. R EV. 144, 155–56 (2016) (noting that Justice
Scalia was inconsistent in his approach and sometimes relied on original expected applications); John
O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24
C ONST. C OMMENT. 371, 378–79 (2007) (arguing for a substantial role for original expected
applications in originalist interpretation).
44. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Evan Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of
Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 25 (2018); Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex
Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. R EV. 1, 4 (2011); Solum, Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism,
supra note 5, at 1249.
45. See, e.g., Lawrence Solum, Eyer on the Relationship of Textualism and Originalism, LEGAL
THEORY B LOG, (Apr. 29, 2022), https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2022/04/eyer-on-therelationship-of-textualism-and-originalism.html (“Public Meaning Originalism is a form of
textualism.”)
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textualist in nature, i.e., that it is incapable of being applied in ways that
are contrary to text and to textualism. 46
But this perception—while common—is false. As set out below,
“original public meaning” is in practice entirely capable of being applied
in ways that are contra-textualist in nature, just like its original intent
predecessors. Indeed, “original public meaning” can, in practice, lead to
results that are virtually indistinguishable from now discredited (and
contra-textualist) theories of original intent. Below, I begin by asking the
question of whether “original public meaning,” as a concept, is inherently
incapable of being applied in ways that are contra-textualist in nature, and
demonstrate that it is not. I then turn to a recent example of “original
public meaning” being applied in practice in ways that are inconsistent
with fidelity to text.
As a concept, the shift from original intent to original public meaning
involved two key moves 47 : (1) a change in the actors whose perspective
an originalist is endeavoring to uncover (from the Founders to the
“original public”); and (2) a change from “intent” to “meaning.” Thus,
one easy way to assess whether the shift to original public meaning
inherently forecloses contra-textualist results is to ask whether either of
these shifts inherently and necessarily ensures that antagonistic
applications of history to supersede text do not occur in originalist
analysis. As set out below, the answer to this question is plainly no: neither
of the foundational shifts from original intent to original public meaning
foreclose antagonistic applications of history to supersede text.
This is easiest to see in the case of the first of these conceptual
shifts—the change in the actor whose perspective an originalist is
endeavoring to uncover from the Founders to the original public. While
this shift addressed other critiques of the originalist enterprise, 48 it plainly
did nothing to address the problem of “expected applications” or
gerrymandering of text. That is, the “original public,” whether real or
hypothesized, may—just like the Founders—have contra-textual
expectations about where a broad text may apply. Just like the Founders,
the real or imagined public may have biases about who deserves the

46. See source cited supra note 45.
47. As I turn to in just a moment, it arguably includes many more moves if one includes all of
the academic infrastructure of academic original public meaning theorizing. Because “original public
meaning” is a widely used construct, most often applied in practice without resort to that academic
infrastructure, I begin here with the basic concept.
48. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 39, at 8-9 (describing the array of early critiques of original
intent originalism).
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benefits of rights or the sanction of criminal or regulatory law that
fundamentally affect what applications are anticipated.
Nor does the shift from “intent” to “meaning” necessarily avoid the
problem of “expected application” or of originalist approaches that are
contrary to text. “Meaning” is itself an exceptionally broad term, which
may connote different things to different adjudicators. It could prompt an
adjudicator to ask a question that is consistent with both textualism and
originalism (an allied question), such as “What meaning would the
original public have understood the words or phrases of a legal text to
have, at the level of generality at which they are pitched?”—and then to
neutrally apply the principle thereby derived to the application at hand.
But it could just as easily prompt an adjudicator to ask a question which
is inconsistent with textualism (an antagonistic question), such as “Would
the meaning of the law’s text have been understood by the original public
to extend to this particular context?” The latter question in practice is both
virtually indistinguishable from discredited “original intent” approaches,
and highly likely to lead us away from fidelity to textualism. 49
Again, Holy Trinity—long derided by textualists for its open
derogation of text—provides an excellent example of this. 50 The Supreme
Court in Holy Trinity explicitly acknowledged that it was deviating from
the broad text of a criminal statute barring the importation of aliens,
because the migration of professionals from England was not within what
Congress intended. 51 But it would have been just as easy for the Court to
have crafted an opinion stating that the “original public meaning” of the
law only included the work of the “manual laborer, as distinguished from
that of the professional man”—because the public, in light of the historical
context, would have understood the statute’s terms to be limited to that
context (i.e., the statute’s “meaning,” as understood by the “public” would
have been limited to a proscription on the importation of poor laborers
lacking in American values—even though its text was facially much
broader). 52 Indeed, even modern “corpus linguistics” techniques could
49. For this reason, while I agree with James Macleod that the question that is being asked in
the “original public meaning” inquiry is a key, often submerged feature of originalist analysis, I
disagree with his suggested approach, which is to adopt an as-applied framing. See Macleod, supra
note 8, at 62-72.
50. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
51. Id. at 458-72.
52. Id. at 463. I am unaware of any research that has in fact confirmed that the public, as
opposed to Congress, had this belief. The important point here is that if the public did possess such a
view—or, as is as often the case, a judge imagined they would based on presumed biases or beliefs
of the public—it would be entirely consistent with “original public meaning” to reach an identical
contra-textual result to the one that most textualist/originalists have derided.
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have been harnessed in service of this outcome, by showing that the words
“importation . . . of any alien or aliens” almost exclusively appeared in the
context of importation of poor laborers from disfavored countries. 53 In
short, it is equally possible to gerrymander text by adverting to the limited
imagination or the biases of the public, as it is to abrogate text by adverting
to the limited imagination of Congress or the Founders. And the word
“meaning” is insufficiently precise to exclude “meanings” that are
founded on such biases or lack of imagination.
Of course, one rejoinder to all this might be to suggest that “original
public meaning” is not a thin concept as I have presented it here, but rather
must be understood as incorporating all of the infrastructure of subsidiary
rules that academic original public meaning theorists have afforded it—
and that so understood, original public meaning is truly inconsistent with
contra-textualist results. I doubt that this is wholly true—while the
academic scaffolding that has been afforded to “original public meaning”
seems to me likely to lessen the likelihood that “original public meaning”
will slide into antagonistic approaches, it is hard to suggest that it entirely
forecloses such approaches, especially given inconsistencies among
“original public meaning” theorists. 54 But even more importantly, in the
real world we know that most originalist adjudicators apply a thin version
of “original public meaning” without resort to this academic
infrastructure. 55 Thus, as a real-world interpretive theory, it is ordinarily
the thin version of “original public meaning” that controls.
53. Cf. Franklin, supra note 9, at 141-44 (describing the use of corpus linguistics methodologies
in the context of the LGBT Title VII cases to argue that the most common places in which the
terminology was used must be the full “ordinary public meaning” of the statutory text).
54. While I could not hope here to address all of the nuanced rules that various theorists have
suggested should be attached to public meaning originalism (itself telling as to the likelihood that
these rules are known and fully adopted by adjudicators), the core thesis of Public Meaning
Originalism, as articulated by one of its leading proponents, is as follows: “the claim that the best
understanding of constitutional meaning focuses on the meaning communicated by the constitutional
text to the public at the time each constitutional provision was framed and ratified.” See Lawren ce
B. Solum, The Public Meaning Thesis: An Originalist Theory of Constitutional Meaning, 101
B OSTON U. L. R EV. 1953, 1953 (2021). While this might on its face appear to be textualist in nature,
it is important to note that it retains precisely the same flexibility and manipulability that is inherent
in a “thin” version of original public meaning. What “meaning” are we asking about? The meaning
of the words as they might be understood by the public in establishing principles consistent with the
level of generality at which they are pitched? Or the meaning of the text to the public as applied to
specific contexts—which might lead to gerrymandering of the text as a result of biases,
misconceptions, and many other issues? Only the former question will predictably avoid
“antagonistic” applications of originalism vis-à-vis text.
55. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 82-101; see also Solum, supra note 5, at 1255
(acknowledging that some uses of originalism by judges “display very little awareness of originalist
scholarship,” but identifying a handful of sitting judges that display a “sophisticated command of
originalist theory.”)
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Given all this, the dangers of conflating textualism with originalism
under the singular rubric of “original public meaning” seem plain. A
“thin” version of “original public meaning,” which is the version that is
most likely to be applied by real-world adjudicators, does nothing to
prevent “antagonistic” applications of originalism to supersede text. And
yet adjudicators have been told, and may have absorbed, the message that
“original public meaning” is an inherently textualist methodology, under
which they cannot, as textualists go astray. Especially in the situations
where it matters most—where an adjudicator’s ideological priors cause
them to be disinclined to read the text as reaching a result that they
disfavor—we should not be surprised that this often leads to a slide into
contra-textualist results. Indeed, without disaggregating textualism and
originalism—and recognizing that they need not track in the same
direction—such antagonistic results seem virtually assured in cases of
ideological divergence.
An excellent real-world example of this can be seen in the recent
disputes over the inclusion of LGBT workers within Title VII’s
protections—an issue that was ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court
in the case of Bostock v. Clayton County. 56 This is an especially striking
example because the textualist principles on which LGBT plaintiffs relied
were pioneered by conservative textualist/originalist Justices on the
Supreme Court—and thus ought to have presented an easy textualist case
for those Justices. Thus, it was Justice Thomas who authored the Supreme
Court opinion in Gross v. FBL Financial that held that “because of
[protected class status]” connotes the principle of “but for causation” as a
matter of plain textual meaning. 57 Four years later, all of the Court’s
conservative textualist/originalists, including Justice Scalia, Justice Alito,
and Justice Thomas, also joined the opinion in UTSMC v. Nassar
extending this textualist interpretation of “because of” as but-for causation
to Title VII. 58
Both Gross and Nassar were decisions in which the Court’s textualist
reasoning—reading “because of” as “but for”—benefitted defendants. 59
But as became clear as disputes over LGBT inclusion in Title VII
developed, it also can lead to pro-plaintiff results. 60 Most saliently to the
56. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S.Ct. 1731 (2020).
57. Gross v. FBL Financial, 557 U.S. 167, 177-78 (2009).
58. Univ. of Tenn. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 350-52 (2013). Of course, a number
of the Court’s current conservative textualist/originalists were not on the Court at the time.
59. See infra sources cited notes 57-58.
60. See Katie Eyer, Statutory Originalism and LGBT Rights, 54 WAKE F OREST L. R EV. 63, 7274 (2019) (pre-Bostock, explaining why the textualist principles articulated in Gross and Nassar
compelled the conclusion that LGBT individuals are covered by Title VII); Katie Eyer,
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discussion here, the application of the textualist “but for” principle leads
inexorably to the conclusion that anti-LGBT discrimination is “because
of . . . sex,” and thus prohibited by Title VII. 61 Thus, as a six-person
majority of the Supreme Court ultimately observed, a man who is fired
for being attracted to other men would have experienced a different
outcome “but for” his sex (i.e., if he were female). 62 That is, “[i]f the
employer fires a male employee for no reason other than the fact he is
attracted to men, the employer discriminates against him for traits or
actions it tolerates in his female colleague.” 63 So too an employer who
terminates a transgender woman for wearing a dress has acted “but-for”
her sex assigned at birth, since the employer would no doubt tolerate
dress-wearing by a woman assigned female at birth. 64
Some commentators and adjudicators—including a number of
progressive ones—have argued against this textual conclusion, or have
argued that textualism is at least indeterminate in this context. 65 But it is
important to note that many of these commentators raise critiques that
utterly ignore the fact that Gross and Nassar had already—before
Bostock—determined what principle flowed from the ordinary textualist
meaning of “because of,” and had found that it connoted “but-for”
causation. 66 As I discuss more fully elsewhere, if textualism is to have
even a modicum of neutrality and ability to restrain, it is critical that
textualist judges follow their own self-professed “plain meaning”
textualist principles even when they lead to divergent ideological
conclusions. Others follow the convention of conflating textualism and
Understanding the Role of Textualism and Originalism in the LGBT Title VII Cases, AM. C ONST.
S OC. B LOG, (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/understanding-the-role-o ftextualism-and-originalism-in-the-lgbt-title-vii-cases/ (same); Brief of Statutory Interpretation and
Equality Law Scholars as Amici Curiae at 4-7, Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S.Ct. 1731 (2020)
(same); see also Katie Eyer, The But-For Theory of Anti-Discrimination Law, 107 VA. L. R EV. 1621
(2021) (describing additional ways that the “but for” principle may be beneficial for antidiscrimination plaintiffs).
61. See infra text accompanying notes 62-64.
62. Bostock, 140 U.S. at 1741.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 66-85. Given the hundreds of pages of critiques of the
Bostock opinion that have been written, I cannot hope to fully respond to them in this short essay.
Nevertheless, I address here what appear to be the principal textualist arguments against the outcome.
66. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman & Guha Krishnamurthi, Bostock Was Bogus: Textualism,
Pluralism, and Title VII, 97 NOTRE DAME L. R EV. 67, 80-91 (2021); Nelson Lund, Unleashed and
Unbound: Living Textualism in Bostock v. Clayton County, 21 F ED. S OC’Y R EV. 158, 180 (2020);
Josh Blackman & Randy Barnett, Justice Gorsuch’s Halfway Textualism Surprises and Disappoints
in the Title VII Cases, NAT. R EV., (June 26, 2020), https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/06/justicegorsuch-title-vii-cases-half-way-textualism-surprises-disappoints/.
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originalism in their analysis—the very phenomenon being critiqued
herein. 67 I take up the problems with conflating textualism and originalism
in the context of the LGBT Title VII cases infra, but first briefly address
what I view as the two most significant—but ultimately unavailing—
textualist critiques that have been made with respect to the Bostock
majority’s reasoning.
The principal argument that has been offered in the aftermath of
Bostock as a justification for why the Court got it wrong from a textualist
standpoint (or at least arguably so) is that the word “discriminate”
connotes something like group-based animus (in this case a desire to harm
women or men) and that such animus is lacking where an employer acts
based on sexual orientation or gender identity. 68 But as Anuj Desai has
shown, this reading of Title VII is not a plausible textualist one, especially
in the context of the consolidated cases in Bostock, all of which involved
67. For example, Cary Franklin’s Living Textualism piece, which critiques textualism as
manipulable and indeterminant—and specifically argues that a textualist approach to the Title VII
LGBT issue suffers from similar defects—conflates originalism and textualism, something that
significantly affects aspects of her analysis. See generally, Franklin, supra note 9, passim. Thus,
while I agree with a number of Franklin’s observations as to the manipulability and problems of
“original public meaning” (which she treats as the standard-bearer for textualism throughout her
piece), I view those as problems arising from the inappropriate conflation of originalism and
textualism, not from textualism properly understood. That being said, I will note that Franklin’s
methodological choice in this regard is probably reasonable (though not one I would make), in view
of the fact that many self-professed textualist/originalists similarly conflate the two methodologies
under the rubric of “original public meaning.” But to me, the manipulability that Franklin
demonstrates is reason to disaggregate textualism and originalism, not to, to use a colloquialism
“throw out the baby (textualism) with the bathwater (originalism).” Note that some of Franklin’s
observations also parallel some of the genuinely textualist issues that I address immediately below,
but that I disagree with her conclusions as to whether there is more than one plausible textualist
response to those questions.
68. This is the primary argument offered by prominent textualist/originalist scholars Randy
Barnett and Josh Blackman. See, e.g., Blackman & Barnett, supra note 66; Josh Blackman, Justice
Gorsuch’s Legal Philosophy Has a Precedent Problem, C ATO INST., (July 24, 2020),
https://www.cato.org/commentary/justice-gorsuchs-legal-philosophy-has-precedent-problem.
For
the reasons set out herein, I disagree with Barnett and Blackman that this conclusion follows from the
presence of the word “discriminate” in Title VII, and I do not believe their argument engages fully
with the actual syntactic structure of Title VII’s language. Barnett and Blackman also argue or at least
imply that the “but-for” principle as a non-textualist one, ignoring the fact that this reading of Title
VII was explicitly pioneered by textualist judges under the banner of textualism in cases such as Gross
and Nassar. Blackman & Barnett, supra note 66; see also Lund, supra note 66, at 180 (also making
this argument). I happen to agree with the textualist ruling in Gross and Nassar, reading “because of”
as connoting the “but for” principle. But regardless, as I discuss in my fuller treatment of this issue in
Textualism Revisited, if textualism is to have any credibility as a methodology, it must include at a
minimum, a commitment to adhering to “plain meaning” textualist readings of the same text across
differing contexts. In the interest of space, I do not elaborate on this argument here, but take as a given
that textualists of good faith should adopt recent textualist readings of key phrases (especially those
articulated by themselves) even where they are applied to new, perhaps ideologically divergent
contexts.
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terminations. 69 Specifically, the relevant provision of Title VII provides
“it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 70 When the
actual statutory text is read, it becomes apparent that the term
“discriminate” does not textually modify terminations at all—it is
unlawful for an employer to “discharge any individual . . . because of
sex,” full stop. 71 This alone is sufficient to decide the cases at issue in
Bostock, which all involved terminations. 72 But as Desai has persuasively
argued, the syntactic context of “discriminate” also clearly suggests that
even in the context of “terms, conditions or privileges of employment,”
“discriminate” is simply meant to connote other forms of disadvantageous
treatment (like termination or non-hiring), not to import a strong intent or
malice requirement. 73
Importantly, this reading of the text of Title VII is not only the most
obvious one syntactically, it is also the reading of the text that has been
adopted by all of the Court’s textualist/originalist Justices, including
Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas, in cases like Ricci v. DeStefano. 74 In
Ricci, white firefighters argued that the city’s action in scrapping the
results of a promotion test because of its racial disparate impact was
69. See Anuj C. Desai, Is Title VII an “Anti-Discrimination” Law?, 93 COLO. L. R EV. (Digital)
(Feb. 17, 2022). Note that although I agree with the Supreme Court’s conclusion on this issue in
Bostock, which is that “discriminate” connotes nothing more than adverse differential treatment, I
find Desai’s analysis of the reasons for this conclusion more compelling, and thus track that analysis
more closely here than that actually employed by the Court. For the Court’s reasoning, see Bostock
140 S.Ct. at 1740:
What did “discriminate” mean in 1964? As it turns out, it meant then roughly
what it means today: To make a difference in treatment or favor (of one as
compared to others).” Webster’s New International Dictionary 745 (2d ed.
1954). To “discriminate against” a person then, would seem to mean treating
that individual worse than others who are similarly situated.
Cf. Franklin, supra note 9, at 146 (pointing out the subjectivity in the majority’s choice of dictionary
definition, as well as the substantial subjectivity built into the dissenters’ corpus linguistics based
understanding of “discriminate against”).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
71. Id.
72. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S.Ct. 1731 (2020).
73. Desai’s argument is well worth reading in full, and expresses the textualist argument better
than I can here in this brief discussion. For his full discussion, see Desai, supra note 69.
74. 557 U.S. 557 (2009). Of course, Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett were not yet on
the Court at this time, and all of them are also self-described textualists.
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discrimination because of race within the meaning of Title VII. 75 In
opposing this conclusion, the United States as Amicus Curiae specifically
argued that “discriminat[ion]” in the context of Title VII connoted an
intentionalist paradigm with respect to the harm caused to white workers
which could not be met in this type of disparate impact case. 76 And yet
the Court rejected the argument that Title VII’s requirement of
“discrimination” carried any such connotation. 77
The other principal textualist argument relied on to attempt to dispute
the majority outcome in Bostock (or at least to suggest that it was not
foreordained by textualism) is equally easily shown to be erroneous.
Specifically, some judges and commentators have suggested that antiLGBT discrimination is not “because of” sex, even taking the but-for test
on its own terms, since two things (sexual orientation and sex) are altered
in the counterfactual when we imagine a lesbian woman, for example,
being fired for marrying a woman. 78 But this view represents a simple
analytical mistake, as we can see by looking at other forms of relational
discrimination. 79 Indeed every form of relational discrimination can be
repackaged as outside of the “but for” causation test, but only through a
sleight of hand that obscures the mechanisms of the underlying relational
discrimination. 80
Consider for example, the historical practice (which persisted for
more than a decade following Brown v. Board of Education) of only
employing Black teachers at Black schools and white teachers at white
schools. 81 Most of us can easily see that a qualified Black teacher who is
refused employment at a white school because of this policy has been
denied employment “because of” or “but for” their individual race.
Nevertheless, a state could easily characterize their policy as a ban on
“cross-racial placements,” and could endeavor to argue that “two things,”
75. See Petitioners Brief on the Merits at *43-45, Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
76. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557
(2009); see also Ricci, 557 U.S. at 579-80 (acknowledging that the United States had made this
argument and rejecting it).
77. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 579-80.
78. See, e.g., Bostock, 140 S.Ct. at 1762 (Alito, J., dissenting); Lund, supra note 66, at 180;
Berman & Krishnamurthi, supra note 66, at 101-13.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 74-77; see also Brief of Statutory Interpretation
Scholars, supra note 60, at 7-10 (also making this point).
80. See sources cited infra note 79.
81. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). I follow here the convention of some
media sources of capitalizing Black, but not white. For an explanation of the reasons for this
convention, see, e.g., C OLUMBIA JOURNALISM R EV., https://www.cjr.org/analysis/capital-b-blackstyleguide.php. For a discussion of the issue of teacher segregation, both past and present, see Wendy
Parker, Desegregating Teachers, 86 WASH U. L. R EV. 1 (2008).
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not one, are changed when a Black teacher compares themselves to a
white teacher in asking whether they would have been hired to work at a
white school “but for” their race. As the state might (misleadingly) argue,
the white comparator is not only white, but they are also seeking an
appropriate “within race” placement, not a prohibited “cross race”
placement. But as most of us can easily see, this reasoning is spurious. As
to the individual Black applicant, they would have been hired at the white
school but-for their race (i.e., if they were white). And the “second” thing
that has changed is not a “second” thing at all—it is simply a repackaging
of that same “but for discrimination.”
As the above example illustrates, most of us can easily spot the
logical fallacy in trying to repackage relational discrimination into a
distinctive “but for” cause (which then, it is argued, obviates the but-for
causal role of protected class status). Specifically, such an approach
attempts to obscure the fact that the relational discrimination itself would
not have occurred “but for” the employee’s protected class status. But the
reality is of course, that relational discrimination takes place precisely
“because of” or “but for” the individual’s protected class status (if the
teacher were not Black, she would not have had the proscribed cross-racial
relationship to the school). Indeed, repackaging relational discrimination
under a label like banned “cross-racial placements” is simply placing a
new label on what is, beneath the surface, individual instances of but-for
discrimination (each employee would not have the banned relational
status, but-for their individual race).
This is equally true in the context of sexual orientation and gender
identity discrimination. For example, “sexual
orientation”
discrimination—terminating a woman because she is attracted to women
when one would not terminate a man—is the same thing as engaging in
discrimination “but for” the woman’s sex (since the woman would not
have been penalized for being attracted to women were she not a woman).
Repackaging this as an independent causal factor which must be
separately accounted for is nonsensical—it is the same causal factor
stated differently. Just as the Black employee was not hired “but for” their
race—even though we could repackage it as being because they desired a
prohibited “cross-race placement”—the woman here is treated differently
“but for” her sex—even though we could repackage it as being because
she had prohibited “same-sex” attraction. Either way, at the level of the
individual, if protected class status were different, the employer would
have responded differently (and more favorably).
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The Supreme Court has easily recognized this in the cases in which
this issue has arisen historically. 82 For example, in the case of Dothard v.
Rawlinson, the Court easily concluded that it was facially disparate
treatment “because of sex” to refuse employment to a woman who sought
work as a prison guard in a men’s prison—even though the state’s
regulation was facially gender-neutral, proscribing cross-sex employment
for men and women alike. 83 Given Title VII’s focus on whether an
individual was treated differently “but-for” their sex—which the
individual woman at issue in Dothard clearly had been—this conclusion
seems inescapable. 84
Thus, textualism—and indeed the very textualist principles
developed by the Court’s leading textualist/originalist Justices—required
the Court in Bostock to conclude that anti-LGBT discrimination is
“because of” sex and included within Title VII. 85 Moreover, contrary to
some of the misleading discourse around this issue, an “allied” approach
to textualism and originalism, in which originalism is used to identify the
original meaning of a statute’s terms, changes nothing about the
conclusion that fidelity to text in this circumstance required the
application of Title VII to LGBT workers. 86 The term “because of” has
not changed in its meaning since the 1960s. 87 And while the content of
the term “sex” arguably has evolved in its meaning, even applying the
narrowest 1960s-era understanding of sex—as sex assigned at birth—one
reaches the same result. 88 Indeed, as elaborated above, even applying the
narrowest historical understanding of sex, anti-LGBT discrimination is
necessarily “but for” sex, since the employee is treated adversely for traits
or actions that would be tolerated in an employee of a different sex. 89
82. See infra text accompanying note 83. Cary Franklin identifies a number of Title VII
contexts where the lower courts have found differently. See Franklin, supra note 9, at 28-32. All of
those contexts would be inconsistent with the “but for” principle—which Franklin relies on as a reaso n
for questioning the but-for principle, but which I would rely on as a basis for questioning the legal
justification of those practices, except insofar as another textualist justification (such as no change in
“terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”) exists on the facts.
83. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-34 & n.16 (1977). The Court has also of course
rejected this argument in the context of constitutional law, though on different grounds. See, e.g.,
McLaughlin v. State of Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-93 (1964).
84. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 332; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (“It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex. . . .”).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 60-84.
86. See, e.g., Eyer, Statutory Originalism, supra note 60, at 72-80.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 59-64.
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Thus, any textualist—who views their ultimate fidelity as to text, not
history—ought to conclude in this circumstance that anti-LGBT
discrimination is proscribed.
And yet both on and off the Supreme Court many self-described
textualist/originalists argued for a different outcome. 90 While the specifics
of their reasoning varied, many included at least some form of arguments
that applied “original expected applications” under the rubric of “original
public meaning” (or its statutory interpretation analogue, “ordinary public
meaning at the time of enactment.”) 91 And many further argued for a
gerrymandering
or
abandonment
of
what
conservative
textualist/originalists themselves had previously articulated as antidiscrimination law’s core textual principles (“because of”=“but-for
causation”). 92 Thus, textualism and originalism were situated as
antagonists by many prominent textualist/originalists, despite the
widespread application of a modern “original public meaning”
approach. 93
For example, although textualist/originalist Justice Gorsuch authored
the majority opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County, applying an “allied”
approach to textualism and originalism, and ruling in favor of LGBT
employees, several of his textualist/originalist colleagues were in
dissent. 94 Most notably, Justices Alito and Thomas, who had pioneered
the but-for textualist reading of “because of . . . [protected class status]”
in earlier cases, argued in this context that following their own textualist
principles was inappropriate. 95 Rather, Justice Alito, joined in dissent by
90. See supra text accompanying notes 65-84 and infra text accompanying notes 94-102.
91. See infra text accompanying notes 94-102. As noted, supra, some progressive
commentators in my view also erroneously took at face value the assertions of the dissenters in
Bostock that what they were applying was textualism, as opposed to an inappropriately conflated
version of textualism and originalism. See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 9, at 120; see also Tara Leigh
Grove, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. R EV. 265, 266-67 (2020) (characterizing the dissenters’
approach in Bostock as a form of “flexible textualism”). As stated herein, my own view is that once
textualism and originalism are appropriately disaggregated, it becomes plain that the arguments that
were made by the dissenters in Bostock are inconsistent with textualism—although they are consistent
with some originalist approaches. That is, in the terminology of this Essay, the dissenters are
deploying approaches in Bostock in which the version of originalism they are deploying is
“antagonistic” to a textualist methodology.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59, and infra text accompanying notes 94-102.
93. As this illustrates and as described supra, “original public meaning” can encompass
multiple different approaches, including those that are functionally indistinguishable on this issue
from “original intent” approaches. See supra text accompanying notes 47-53.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 95-99.
95. See Bostock, 140 S.Ct. at 1754-84 (Alito, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting) (nowhere
even acknowledging the textualist but-for principle that they pioneered in Gross and Nassar, and
making arguments inconsistent with that principle and with the statute’s text).
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Justice Thomas, argued that a proper analysis must ask “[h]ow would the
terms of a statute have been understood by ordinary people at the time of
enactment” (ignoring that they themselves had already answered this
question in prior cases)—and more specifically “[w]ould [the original
public] have thought that this language prohibited discrimination because
of sexual orientation or gender identity?” 96
Observe the easy slide here from what could be an “allied” approach
to textualism and originalism—the question of, at a big picture level how
the words “because of . . . sex” would have been understood by ordinary
people at the time—to an “antagonistic” one, in which the expectations of
the original public about a particular application are deemed controlling.
The former question had already been answered by Justices Alito and
Thomas in prior cases like Gross and Nassar (“because of sex” means
“but-for sex”)—in a way that compelled the conclusion that LGBT
employees were covered in Bostock. 97 But of course, as Justice Alito and
Thomas pointed out, asking the second, very different question, most
likely leads to a different conclusion. 98 Because, as Justices Alito and
Thomas note, there was widespread discrimination and bias against the
LGBT community in 1964, it seems unlikely that the original public
would have expected Title VII’s principles—however textually broad and
capacious—to confer rights on the LGBT community. 99 But this is of
course not a question of what Title VII’s text meant at the time—it is a
question of how the original public’s biases would have influenced their
perception of the specific applications to which those broad principles
should extend.
Similarly, before Bostock textualist/originalist lower court judges
often raised arguments against LGBT Title VII inclusion on the basis of
antagonistic applications of originalism and textualism under the rubric of
“original public meaning” (though typically purporting to apply an
“allied” textualist/originalist approach). 100 For example, Judge Ho in the
pre-Bostock case of Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Company argued in
concurrence to his own majority opinion that a textualist/originalist ought
to conclude that LGBT employees are not covered by Title VII because
the statute’s broad language—”because of sex”—would not have been
understood at the time to extend to the context of LGBT employees. 101
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 1766, 1767.
See supra text accompanying notes 56-64.
See infra text accompanying note 99.
Bostock, 140 S.Ct. at 1769-73.
See infra text accompanying notes 101-06.
See Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co., 915 F.3d 328, 334-35 (5th Cir. 2019) (Ho, J., concurring).
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Similarly, Judge Sykes, while arguing in dissent for fidelity to the text of
Title VII in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, nevertheless pitched
her analysis of its “original public meaning” not at what Title VII’s broad
words meant in principle at the time, but rather at whether the application
of those principles to sexual orientation discrimination specifically would
have been anticipated. 102
What is perhaps most striking about these many instances of
textualist/originalists judges applying an antagonistic approach to
textualism and originalism in the context of the LGBT Title VII cases is
that many appeared not to recognize that it was even possible for an
“original public meaning” approach to be contrary to textualism, much
less that they themselves were applying it in this way. 103 But as described
above, “original public meaning” as an approach can easily be applied in
a manner that is both inconsistent with textualism and functionally
indistinguishable from discredited theories of original intent—asking not
what the textual principles are that a broadly worded statute or
constitution adopts, but rather whether a particular less-favored
application was desired or anticipated. Without disaggregating textualism
and originalism, it may become impossible for even a judge who is
committed in theory to textualism to see where originalism and textualism
have become antagonists and thus to consistently honor text.
III. CONCLUSION
The above sections have argued that textualism and originalism are
not the same interpretive theory—and indeed in practice can conflict. But
if this is true, what are we to take from this? This Part argues in conclusion
that this common-sense insight has important implications, both for those
who subscribe to textualism as a legal methodology, and for those who
currently do not.
For those who subscribe to textualism (or to textualism/originalism)
as a methodology, recognizing the distinctiveness and potential for
conflict between textualism and originalism as legal methodologies is key
to honoring any genuine commitment to text. Adjudicators and others who
consider themselves to be both textualists and originalists must not simply
assume that the two are compatible and can be conflated, but rather must
take seriously the project of ensuring fidelity to both text and to history
are honored through only “allied” approaches. Where historical
102. See Hively v. Ivy Tech Comm. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 359-63 (7th Cir. 2017) (Sykes, J.,
dissenting).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 91-102.
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approaches are situated “antagonistically” to textual ones, a textualist’s
ultimate fidelity ought to be to the law’s text.
Moreover, it is critical for those who consider themselves textualists,
or both textualists and originalists, to remember that “original public
meaning” is essentially an empty vehicle. While original public meaning
can be used as a basis for semantic arguments that are entirely consistent
with textualism (“allied” approaches), without a fundamental, clear and
unwavering commitment to text as the ultimate guiding lodestar, it can
also be used as a basis for arguments that are fundamentally inconsistent
with textualism (“antagonistic” approaches). Indeed, original public
meaning is such a capacious concept that it can allow approaches that are
for most purposes (except the identity of the actor whose intentions are
being divined) essentially indistinguishable from long-rejected “original
intent” forms of originalist theory. Thus, the fact that originalist reasoning
comes in “original public meaning” garb says little about whether its
arguments are made in service of—or in contravention of—interpreting
text.
Finally, it is important for textualists to understand that uncritical
uses of originalism may not only challenge their fidelity to text, but the
very legitimacy of the textualist enterprise. The central claim of many
textualist scholars and judges has been that textualism offers the promise
of the rule of law through its ability to constrain judges. 104 The central
claim of many of textualism’s critics has been that this promise is false,
and that textualism is inherently non-constraining, manipulable, and
politicized. 105 Conflating textualism and originalism—and in so doing
permitting “antagonistic” applications of history to supersede text—
fundamentally undermines the core promise of textualism to afford equal
access to the law’s protections as written to all.
The above are the implications for those who ascribe to textualism—
but what about for those who do not? For critics, or for those who are
simply uncommitted to any legal methodology, what are the implications
of the account provided herein? One argument might be that this account
should be seen as a further reason to critique textualism—as inconsistent,
partisan, and manipulable. 106 Perhaps, on this account, textualism should
be seen as irredeemably tainted by its longstanding association with

104. See, e.g., S CALIA, supra note 1, at 25 (“Long live formalism. It is what makes a government
a government of laws and not of men.”)
105. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 38, 41, 47.
106. Cf. Franklin, supra note 9, at 123-24 (making this argument about textualism as “original
public meaning”).
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originalism, and the ability for modern theories of originalism to be
applied antagonistically in derogation of text.
But this ignores the many virtues that a textualism disentangled from
antagonistic originalism could have. While a full account of these virtues
is the work of a longer project—and beyond the scope of this Essay—it
may suffice here to observe that a true textualism, in which ultimate
fidelity is to text, may be a critical bulwark against inequality in the
application of the law. 107 The Bostock opinion—declining to gerrymander
LGBT workers out of the broad textual protections of Title VII—provides
one important example of this. 108 Justice Thomas’s textualist critiques of
qualified immunity provide another. 109 In short, if we wish to ensure that
all have equal access to the law’s protections—and bear equally the law’s
burdens—we could do worse that a theory that takes the language of the
law as it finds it, with equal application of its broad terms.
In short, the time may have come for all of us, both adherents and
non-adherents alike, to view textualism with fresh eyes, disentangled from
its longstanding conflation with originalism. For whether one views
oneself as a textualist, an originalist, both, or neither, there is much to be
gained from understanding the difference between textualism and
originalism, and to ensuring in application that methodological
commitments are honored.

107. For a very brief treatment of this issue, see Katie Eyer, Progressive Textualism in Statutory
Interpretation, in Laying Claim to the Constitution, C ONST’L ACCOUNTABILITY C TR. (2021 ed.),
https://www.theusconstitution.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/The-2021-Edition-of-Laying-Claimto-the-Constitution.pdf.
108. See Bostock, 140 S.Ct. at 1751 (“As Yeskey and today’s cases exemplify, applying
protective laws to groups that were politically unpopular at the time of the law’s passage—wheth er
prisoners in the 1990s or homosexual and transgender employees in the 1960s—often may be seen as
unexpected. But to refuse enforcement just because of that, because the parties before us happened to
be unpopular at the time of the law’s passage, would not only require us to abandon our role as
interpreters of statutes; it would tilt the scales of justice in favor of the strong or popular and neglect
the promise that all persons are entitled to the benefit of the law’s terms.”).
109. See, e.g., Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S.Ct. 1862 (2020) (Thomas, J. dissenting from denial of
certiorari).

